Presentation on Australia's 'National Defence Review 2023'
Presentation on Australia's 'National Defence Review 2023'
On Australia’s strategy in the Indo-Pacific: a SWOT analysis.
Caleb, via Unsplash.
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This presentation takes tremendous inspiration from a publication from the Australian National University’s Strategic & Defence Studies Centre: “A Geostrategic SWOT Analysis for Australia”, by John Blaxland. It has been adapted to reflect the changes undertaken by policymakers and planners, as outlined in NDR23.
For further reading on my previous — more detailed — analysis on AUKUS, refer to this 2023 essay.
Australia’s National Defence Review 2023 (NDR23) is the nation’s chief strategic document. Its stated aims are “to provide a strategic assessment and a far-reaching strategy for the nation and the Government, as well as a roadmap for [the Department of] Defence to implement our [the authors’] recommendations.”
Summary of NDR23
Australia’s strategic circumstances
Australia perceives the region in which it is located (the Indo-Pacific) to be the gravitational centre of an escalating major power strategic competition. This competition is headed by:
The United States of America: the former unipolar leader of the Indo-Pacific, and chief defence partner of Australia;
And the People’s Republic of China: the revisionist challenger to America’s regional (and global) leadership, and Australia’s main economic partner.
The globe centered on Australia.
The Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific regions, via Sydney Morning Herald.
Climate change, a “recent” addition to the challenges Australia faces, is a factor that Australia’s Department of Defence considers important, especially considering the increased humanitarian and disaster relief efforts it must undertake.
Defence as a “whole-of-government” endeavour
Australia is going through a doctrinal shift in its defence policy:
The old doctrine of Defence of Australia aimed to deter and respond to potential low-level threats from small and middle powers.
This has been updated to a National Defence doctrine which considers growing threats which greaty challenge the regional balance of power and requires a “whole-of-government” and “whole-of-nation” approach to security, meaning placing security and defence at the forefront of policy development and international engagement.
Alliances and defence partnerships
Australia’s security has long been dependent on allies and partners. Chief among these, however, is the alliance with the United States (which is notably always capitalised when mentioned in official documents). Australia aims to have greater US forces rotating in the region, increased technological and industrial information exchanges, and to obtain (on the long term) greater capabilities from the US, with a focus on submarine and missile forces (through AUKUS) that can expand its maritime strategic depth.
Artistic rendition of a future AUKUS submarine.
Force design and structure
Australia reckons the ADF’s (Australian Defence Force) current tools and institutional architecture are inadequate for the new strategic environment it operates in. A key aspect of the reforms it aims to achieve is to transform the ADF into a “genuine Integrated Force”, meaning it can operate seemlessly across all domains of warfare and in multi-national operations.
Some selected capabilities critical to this new ADF approach’s operational success:
Important considerations on materiel acquisition, workforce retention, and finance:
NDR23 recognises current shortcomings in ADF and public service workforces. To overcome these challenges, pay and service conditions are being revamped in order to avoid a brain-drain in the defence sector.
A new policy of acquisition is being implemented. Previous acquisition philosophies emphasised getting the best materiel via complex processes. This led to a state of affairs in which procurement takes too long and often cannot deliver in scale. The new philosophy moves away from this and is based on “minimum viable capability in the shortest possible time”.
Financing is to undergo significant transformation and reprioritisation. Trade-offs are necessary both within the Defence budget — re-focusing efforts — and on the national finances’ side. The new strategic circumstance requires an increased investment that may need to be implemented faster than the budgetary shock it represents can subside.
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Notice: AUKUS and US investment and technology sharing agreedments have the potential to add greatly to Australia’s economy and workforce, ameliorating possible budgetary and economic shocks.
A SWOT analysis of Australian strategy through the lens of NDR23
Strengths
Internal aspects which positively affect the attainment of Australia’s goals.
Geography: Australia is geographically protected from its strategic competitors to the North. With plenty of states between itself and China, and few unprotected maritime routes linking the two (most of them between narrow straits across the Indonesian archipelago). Likewise, the chief urban and economic centres of Australia are located in the South-Eastern corner of the country, which has easier access to maritime routes across the Pacific towards its main strategic partner — the US. Additionally, vital strategic assets such as the Pine Gap communications and intelligence base are located safely within Australia’s vast interior, which provides the country with significant strategic depth.
Economy: Australia’s economy is vast and resource-rich, and its workforce is highly qualified. Being a net exporter of agricultural products, it is (despite its relative geographic isolation) mostly safe from food insecurity. Likewise, its natural resources are highly sought after for industrial and military production, especially iron ore and rare earths — some of which it is a world leader in extraction.
Politics: The political system of Australia is remarkably stable. Despite global trends in democratic backsliding, the country has remained a strong democracy with solid rule of law, with populism on both the left and right currently gaining little traction. Likewise, Australia has benefited from extensive incentives for multiculturalism, which have allowed the population and economy to expand significantly over the years with relatively little damage to social cohesion.
Weaknesses
External aspects which negatively affect the attainment of Australia’s goals.
Domestic defence and security solutions: Australia is currently very limited in developing its own military materiel and solutions, being highly dependent on its partners abroad. Australia finds itself often depending on technology sharing agreedments or on military imports with little to no knowledge transfers which might allow it to stand by itself for prolongued periods of time if required. Likewise, cyber-security is of large concern to the nation, with current systems proving inadequate and allowing for great foreign or domestic interference.
Energy: The country’s energy security is bound to international supply chains which might be disrupted if conflict breaks out in Asia. Though domestic efforts for a clean energy transition are ongoing, they are insufficient in the short to medium term and could endanger Australian energy security. Current fuel reserves are also not sufficient to last long periods of time when cut off from the source, and refining is mostly outsourced.
Limited naval strategic depth: Currently, the ADF is unable to — by itself — wholly deny maritime access to opponents and challenge incursions, relying on natural advantages and foreign (chiefly US) support. In part, this is the result of a broader carelessness and dismissal of strategic power competition which only recently has been accepted as the new strategic circumstance of the nation, and is beeing combated through new investment on capability acquisition on the short and medium term — to ensure the bare minimums (what the country can do now, and fast, to implement sea denial) — and on the long term — to guarantee deterrence is effective (what the country can do on the long term to ensure sea control).
Opportunities
External aspects which positively affect the attainment of Australia’s goals.
South Pacific: This region is Australia’s historic gravitational centre. However, it is currently facing challenges such as climate change (which is existential, for many countries) and Chinese overtures. Nonetheless, Australia is very much engaged in the region and has a window of opportunity to maintain its position as the chief area partner for economic and security matters.
ASEAN: This mostly economic group is an important area of interest for Australia, and is suspicious of China’s (Australia’s key security challenge) growing reach and intrusions. Its member nations enjoy cordial relations with Australia and are on the receiving end of technical assistance and capital from the country. Australia can lobby for a security posture favourable to it and skeptical of China in this region if it leverages the development assistance and economic means it can provide (combining efforts with the United States, this could be used to great effect).
QUAD: Australia has the possibility to expand trade, economic, qualifications, and security ties with India and Japan. Both are on cold terms with China and billateral investment is expanding. However, relations with India are disputable as its illiberal streak is growing.
AUKUS: The crown jewel of Australian foreign relations, this recent development is an expansion of Australia’s security relations with the US and includes deepening security ties with the UK. This accord has the potential to bring out great economic investment and technological sharing from the US, as well as a capacity sharing component for submarine forces.
Threats
External aspects which negatively affect the attainment of Australia’s goals.
Foreign interference: Cyber-security and disinformation/subversive concerns are growing in Australia, as the world and its region shifts from a unipolar ‘End of History’ international system to one where ideological, cultural, and identitarian battles are taking place in society and on the ballot boxes of democracies. Likewise, the inadequate cyber-security aparattus is unable to cope with eventual industrial, military, or political interference.
Environment: Environmental challenges, from disease to natural disasters such as droughts and rising sea levels, are particularly damaging to Australia, both internally and externally. Growing climate insecurity in the region may lead to an increase in migration which Australian society — as diverse as it may be — is unable to cope with. These changes, which are not Australian in origin, may lead to increasing sectarian conflict in the Indo-Pacific, resulting in political instability and uncertainty of political and diplomatic arrangements, which China may alleviate (or exploit) in the hopes of gaining clout in the region, isolating Australia from potential partners and diminishing its strategic depth.
Indonesian domestic politics: Indonesia (which has recently shifted towards a more illiberal government) may grow apart from Australia after over 20 years of mitigation of relations over the East-Timor crisis. It remains to be seen whether the new government will be sympathetic to China in exchange of greater capital and development investment, but with an illiberal government and peripheral instability brewing, a negative shift of relations cannot be ruled out and must be actively combated with constructive engagement.
Risk of conflict in East-Asia: China’s growing military has a mission purpose of “reuniting the country” — meaning invading and occupying Taiwan. The prospect of conflict over the island risks severe economic shocks and trade disruptions across the region. Likewise, the US will in some capacity be involved in such a conflict, and may (by virtue of association) extend the conflict to Australia, which hosts important US strategic assets.
Undersea warfare capabilities
Networked expeditionary air operations capability
Expeditionary theatre logistics
Developed network of northern bases
Cross-domain long-range strike capability